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TRADE REGULATION

In a third case dealing with the protection afforded the pedestrian at
a controlled intersection, the reviewing court in Ruggiero v. Pescosolido °

affirmed a judgment for plaintiff where the pedestrian was forced, by a
car blocking the intersection, to step outside the crosswalk.
Becka v. Horvath"' presented the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga
County with a most interesting problem, i.e., the standard of care which
defendant-appellant landlord owed his blind brother-in-law who resided
with him. In supporting the verdict of the trial court, the court of appeals

affirmed the principle that where the handicap of pedestrian is known,
the operator of a motor vehicle owes the pedestrian a greater degree of
care, although this may amount to no more than ordinary care under the
circumstances. Hopefully this rule will be followed in other cases where

blind or infirmed individuals are involved, and the handicap is known or
should be obvious to drivers.
Burke v. Cremeens,"2 decided in 1961, held that whether a guest
passenger was contributorily negligent so as to bar recovery against a
driver other than herself, where there is evidence that her driver was intoxicated, is a question for the jury.
JUSTIN C. SMITH

TRADE REGULATION
OHIo FAIR TRADE LAW
The constitutionality of the 1959 Ohio Fair Trade Law has been
challenged frequently in the common pleas courts.' In Hudson Distribs.,
Inc. v. Upjohn Co the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals sustained
the applicability of the statute to non-contracting parties. On the other
hand, in Mead Johnson & Co. v. Columbus Vitamin & Cosmetic Distribs.,
Inc.' the Franklin County Courts of Appeals held the act unconstitutional. Both cases were appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. The
appeal in the Mead Johnson & Co. case has been dismissed for want of a
substantial constitutional question, and the application for certiorari because of the conflict between the two courts of appeals was unsuccessful.4
Unless the supreme court reviews the Upjohn case and harmonizes
that decision with the practical consequences of its dismissal of the appeal
in the Mead Johnson & Co. case, the legal position of the non-signer will
depend upon the attitude of the court of appeals in the county of his
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residence. Hopefully the Ohio Supreme Court will review the Upjohn
case so that the non-signer's legal position will be uniform throughout
the state.
Another case in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas'
seemed likely to present this same constitutional issue. The plaintiff, a
cosmetics producer, had entered into contracts with certain sellers, which
contracts became the statutory basis for an action to enjoin other sellers
who had no contractual relations with the plaintiff. A temporary restraining order was issued. The trial court refused to grant a motion to dissolve the order. Passing only upon the discretionary power of the trial
court to continue the order, the court of appeals, temporarily at least,
avoided a decision on the merits.
TRADE NAMES

A court of appeals decision illustrates the fact that two generic words
may be joined together in a name which is unique and distinctive. When
such a name has been used continuously for a long time, the user acquires
a property right to it and may restrain its use by the owner of a noncompetitive business.' While the word "national" or "city" is generic and
may not be appropriated, the use of the words in combination for a
period of ninety-five years has resulted in the acquisition of a property
right in a trade name.
Having decided that a bank had acquired an exclusive right to the
trade name "National City," the court then determined that the public
associated in various ways the defendant's corporate name with that of
the bank. This entitled the bank to an injunction against the defendant's
using the words "National City" in its corporate name or in any other
way in connection with its business.'
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6. National City Bank v. National City Window Cleaning Co., 180 N.E.2d 20 (Ohio Cr.
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